Case Studies- USA Wars with and without Turkish
Republic and the Wars Between Turkey, and Russia
Prof. Dr. Veysel
Batmaz,
İstanbul Beykent University
Four broad
questions will continue to be at the heart of any philosophical or political
analysis of war and peace: What does war/peace entail? Why do wars/peace occur?
What connection exists between war and human nature? Is it ever morally
acceptable to go to war?
Until the artificial soldiers take the place of the
human counterparts, these questions will prevail in all discussions of war and
peace, just like what we had been told by Tolstoy and heard from Shostakovich,
and will continue to be asked in order to understand this very problematic
tragedy of human history. On the other hand, contrary what we ever had
experienced so far, after capitalism there will be no tragedies in digitalism.
So, no Tolstoys nor Shostakovichs! Digitalism, as the future mode of
production, could bring an eternal peace among human beings, without erasing war
like hostilities, but the distances, durations, actors, and resources might
change.
So far, war
and peace studies have concentrated on simple ontological questions.
Teleological analyses of wars do not occupy large space in the realm of
academic and diplomatic discussions. Nevertheless, determining which entities
are permitted to start and carry out war is necessary to define what war is in
modernity. Thus, some efforts of teleological concerns might shed light on the
political and diplomatic endeavors.
The Geneva Conventions
of 1949 defined International Armed Conflict (IAC) as, “all cases of declared
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of
them.” This sentence is crucial but not encompassing. IAC “exists whenever
there is a resort to armed force between States” and “can always be assumed
when parts of the armed forces of two States clash with each other.”
War and IAC
should not be confused with each other. War can be between two or more
nongovernmental organizations, as well as recognized States by the UN. IAC can
only exist between States. Today, terrorism, proxy entanglements, narcos cartel
wars, drone wars, border disputes are wars but not called ICA as determined in
the Geneva Conventions.[1]
A citizen’s
conception of war, mediated through mass communication, is very different than
the Geneva Conventions’ technical descriptions; frequently reflects the larger
political beliefs, such as not restricting war to disputes between states or
nations. Conflict between ideologies or political thoughts as well as between
national interests can be, not necessarily but prevalently, alternative
definitions of war, in the minds of people.
While
architects of the Geneva Conventions were preoccupied with what “war” is, general
public’s knowledge and curiosity rests on this questions: Who did win?"
On the other
hand, the causes of war are important matters for politicians and diplomats and
to a certain extent the fairness of war is discussable among intellectuals and
philosophers. Inventories of war, tactics and logistics are important factors
for the military.
Up to now, a
little attention is paid for the patterns of wars/conflicts between states, in
terms of (a) Distance from the core
State(s)-D; (b) Parties Involved-P; (c) Duration of the Conflict-T (d)
Resources used-manpower and Logistics-R(F+C) (e) from the reference point of the winner(s), and losers (WL). In
order to concentrate on the reference point of winners and losers, teleological
patterns should be found in conflict instances.
Thus an
equation could be prompted:
WL= D*/P*/T*/R(F+C)
The regression analyses of teleological equation of
the study of war could be applied to all wars/conflicts, which constitutes of
different manifest patterns: Between two
States/Action Groups or group of States + Action Groups; complexity, intensity
and extent.
Thus, this framework becomes more accurate and teleological
formulation, instead of simply asking “who won” as opposed to asking “who won”
and “with whom,” and “against who?”
Hostility between two modern nations; or hatred
relationships between two ethnicities culminates the ideological presumptions
and disguise or distort the reel “feelings” of two distinct group of social
gatherings, in language, race, or history. But, when a teleological regression
analyses are done in conflictual instances at hand in terms of the pattern of
confrontations, the animosities might evaporate. That
means that the public has been misled by the ideologues or politicians from
diverse interests when two distinct people has no contrary feelings towards
each other with mostly with the same traditional values.
The
reasons of wars are not the people’s hostility but mediated enmity seeded by
the political structural hegemony.
This is the
reason of this study to see the real pattern of war/conflicts, outcomes
appraised with the “winners and losers as reference point” via a teleological
analysis.
In this paper I will only suggest the construction of the empirical analyses framework and give two preliminary and different data construction and analyses examples: (1) The wars of the United States of America (USA), after the Wilson Doctrine, as correlated with the position of Turkish Republic is an ally of the USA, or neutral, or hostile. (2) The wars between Russia (Russian Empire, USSR, RF) and Turkey (Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic). The data examples are the basic crude data measurements of the suggested empirical research framework.
Measurements and scale construction for war patterns
Theoretical war
patterns entails: (1) the overall scope and intensity of a conflict, (2) the
cost and spread of wars, (3) or the “distance and outcome burden” of a conflict
from the perspective of the winner(s), or losers.
Developing a
scale for measuring patterns of wars/conflicts based on several variables from
the reference point of the winner and loser can answer the question derived
from the pattern of wars, to understand not the attempts of politics, but the “real
feelings” of, not the armies but the people involved. Thus, variables of
outcomes and actors of war gain superiority over the distance to core State or
resources and cost (causalities and logistics).
In other words, my goal is to compare different conflicts and identify similar–differential patterns using a structured and numerical scale as an empirical model.
Categories and operationalizing the variables
To above stated purpose, operationalizing each variable into measurable components are done as such:
1. Distance from the war State (1) Geographic distance (km between the capital and the frontline) (2) Political distance (direct party, ally, indirect supporter, neutral), measured with a 0–10 scale: 0 = the main belligerent; 10 = a distant entity only indirectly affected.
This interval variable measures the spatial extent and location of the conflict relative to a central authority or origin point. Distance/Extent (L/N): Measured geographically (e.g., area covered or diameter from core site (L), potentially using a fractal dimension “N” derived from the conflict spread dynamics).
Quantitative Measure: [Scaling Theory: Sources: Sarkees, Meredith Reid, Wayman, Frank Whelon, Resort to war: a data guide to inter-state, extra-state, intra-state, and non-state wars, 1816-2007, CQ Press; c2010; and Brecke, Peter, Violent Conflicts 1400 AD to the Present (2000), 1999]:
A fractal
approximation for geography on which conflict suggests that conflict sites near
the core tend to have more cumulative events than peripheral sites.
Conflict
instances, there might be several, are defined as clusters of events separated
by time and length.
A scale could assign high values to conflicts spanning a large diameter (L) or having a high number of infected geographic sites (N).
Strategic Context: [Geographical Strategy: Source: Sun Tzu, Art of War]
The concept of distance relates to the factor of Earth, which comprises distances (great and small), danger and security, and specific types of terrain (open ground, narrow passes).
The location matters strategically: fighting in one's own territory is considered “dispersive ground,” while penetrating deep into hostile country is “serious ground,” which impacts troop solidarity and logistics. A scale could rank conflicts higher if they occur deep inside hostile territory.
2. Parties involved in the conflict (1) Number of states in each rival grouping (2) Number of non-state actors (militias, terrorist groups, PMCs) (3) Presence of great powers (nuclear powers, regional powers), measured in “complexity of actors” index: Few, homogeneous actors → low complexity and Many diverse actors → high complexity.
This categorical variable focuses on
the identity and relative strength of the actors participating in the conflict.
Parties (Actors/Strength): Quantified
by the number of actors involved and their force ratio.
Armed conflict data records the involved
actors. A scale could quantify this by the number of distinct
parties, and perhaps categorize them (e.g., state actors vs. non-state actors,
which complicate the application of traditional jus ad bellum and jus
in bello principles).
Strategic Measure (Sun Tzu): The most
crucial aspect of parties involved is the comparison of strength to forecast victory or defeat.
A scale must account for the numerical ratio of forces: if forces
are ten to the enemy's one, surround
him; if five to one, attack; if twice as numerous, divide the army. If
forces are equally matched, offer
battle; if slightly inferior, avoid; if quite unequal, flee.
The scale should reflect whether the
conflict involves a superior force
attacking an inferior one, which results in the opponent being in "dire
straits".
Modern Context (AI/Algorithms): The
contemporary context introduces algorithms and autonomous systems as potential
decision-makers or actors, raising dilemmas about human control,
responsibility, and whether these systems can wage a “just” war. While this
doesn't offer a direct scale, it complicates the definition of “parties
involved” in modern conflict, where decisions may be made by machines devoid of
subjectivity.
3. Duration of conflict (1) Measured directly in days/months/years (2) Then, are categorized: 1 = under 1 month; 2 = 1–6 months; 3 = 6–24 months; 4 = 2–5 years; 5 = over 5 years
This
interval variable quantifies the length of the conflict and the associated
dynamics.
Quantitative
Measure (Scaling Theory): The fundamental unit is total
duration (T) of the conflict instances.
Duration (Time), is measured
in time steps (days, weeks, years), inversely weighted due to the inherent
negative cost of prolonged war.
Conflict
instances in the data are generated by combining events within a separation time (Ta), such as Ta=128
days.
Duration is
intrinsically linked to the magnitude of the conflict, as conflict virulence=causalities
(Vr) scales with duration (T). The distribution of duration Pr(T).
“Long delays” and “prolonged warfare” are detrimental;
there is no instance of a country benefiting from them.
A protracted campaign will lead to the exhaustion of State resources and the dulling of weapons and ardor. A scale might assign a higher negative weight to longer conflicts, reflecting the strategic detriment associated with them.
4. Resources used: manpower and logistics (1) Number of troops, mobilization rate, casualties (2) Economic cost, type and scale of weaponry (3) Logistic line length, number of fronts; combined into a “resource intensity index”: Low / medium / high manpower; Low / medium / high economic cost; Low / medium / high logistical complexity. This variable measures the costs and resource depletion relative to the outcome (victory or defeat.) Resources (Cost=F/R/Expenditure): Measured by quantitative outcomes (Fatalities F, or economic cost proxies (e.g., estimated percentage of state/citizen revenue lost), tied directly to whether the entity was the nominal "winner" or "loser" in the conflict
Cost/Expenditure
(Sun Tzu): Resources
are directly quantified by costs. For example, an army of $100,000$ men, the
daily expenditure can reach a thousand ounces of gold.
Loser
Perspective: In a
protracted war, resource depletion (loss of substance and exhaustion of
strength) leads to the people being afflicted by heavy exactions (dissipation
of three-tenths of their income)
and the government spending four-tenths
of its total revenue on material replacement. A loss scenario is
characterized by significant economic strain on the populace and the state.
Winner
Perspective: A wise
general minimizes cost by foraging on
the enemy (one cartload of enemy provisions is equivalent to twenty of
one's own). The objective is victory,
not lengthy campaigns. True victory requires achieving harmony and
adhering to ethical principles, avoiding a Pyrrhic victory (success without
ethics).
Quantitative
Proxy (Scaling Theory): The magnitude of conflict, which represents resource usage and
destruction, is scaled using fatalities
(F). These outcomes are modulated by conflict virulence (Vr, Vf), which is the intensity displayed
across the conflict instances.
A resource scale could measure the total F and R within a conflict and relate it to the outcome: a winner scale would favor high F inflicted on the enemy with low internal F and low expenditure, while a loser scale would reflect the reverse.
4. Winner’s reference point Two components matter here: Gains (territory, regime change, strategic advantage); Costs (human losses, economic damage, diplomatic consequences)
Overall, a “net outcome score” can be created: Gain score – Cost score = Net result.
|
Category |
Variable |
Description
of Scale |
Measurement Method |
Score in Category |
|
1.
Distance |
Geographic Distance |
Distance between main belligerent state and primary
battlefield |
Kilometers |
|
|
Political Distance |
Level of
involvement (direct
actor, ally, supporter, neutral) |
Categorical
scale converted to numeric |
||
|
2. Actors |
Number of States |
Number of nation-states involved |
Absolute number |
|
|
Non-State Actors |
Militias, PMCs, insurgents, etc. |
Count and influence level |
||
|
Great Power Involvement (G7) |
Presence of nuclear/major powers |
0 = none, 10 =
direct involvement |
||
|
3.
Duration |
Length of Conflict |
Total
period of active conflict |
Days/months/years |
|
|
Continuity |
Continuous or intermittent conflict |
0 =
intermittent, 10 =
continuous |
||
|
4.
Resources |
Manpower |
Total troop deployment or mobilization rate |
Absolute |
|
|
Casualties |
Military + civilian losses |
Total |
||
|
Economic Cost |
Estimated financial expenditure |
Local currency |
||
|
Logistical Complexity |
Number of fronts, supply line length |
Expert-based
or formula-based |
||
|
5. Outcomes (Winners Perspective) |
Strategic Gains |
Territory, political goals achieved |
0 = none, 10 = major gains |
|
|
Costs to Winner |
Human, economic, reputational losses |
Higher cost = lower score |
||
|
Net Outcome Score |
Gains Costs |
Derived variable |
||
|
6. General
Index |
Composite Conflict Score |
Weighted average of all variables |
||
The scales can be constructed into informational
weight:
Single
index: (1)
Normalize each variable on a 0–10 scale. (2) Assign weights depending on your
research goals. (3) Compute a weighted average: Conflict Score = weight 1 Distance + weight 2 Complexity
Multidimensional
profile: Distance:
2/10; Duration: 5/5; Resource intensity: 4/5; Net outcome for the winner: 3/5. This
helps reveal patterns: short but intense wars, long low-intensity wars,
multi-actor conflicts, etc.
Some methodological and
ethical considerations will be present: While building such a scale, it’s important to
consider: (1) Data bias: Historical data often reflects the winner’s narrative.
(2) Normative neutrality: Measuring war from the winner’s perspective should
not imply moral approval. (3) Comparability: Ancient wars and modern wars
require careful normalization due to technological differences.
The parties involved and their role in the outcome are
more important for political and diplomatic decisions than who initiated the
war/conflict that might be only classifying the war/conflict at the nominal
scale, and is obviously useful for media coverage for the public.
Measures of wars through distance, actor complexity,
duration, resource use, and winner-oriented outcomes give to the decision
makers robust answers for the future disputes or peaceful outcomes.
To do that, each concept must first be made
measurable, and then combined into either a multidimensional profile or a
weighted index.
This approach can lead to a meaningful analytical tool
for comparing conflicts across history.
At the level of statistical
analyses, each of the catagories could be chosen as independent variable and
correlational (r2 or nonparametric gamma coefficients) with ANCOVA could be
looked at to test the hypotheses at the hand.
This framework, creating a scale to measure patterns
of military conflicts based on distance from the core State, parties involved,
duration, and resources (from the reference point of winners or losers)
requires defining both the measurable, quantitative aspects of conflict
dynamics and the strategic, cost-related elements highlighted in the sources.
The most precise quantitative data for establishing a scale based on geographic extent, duration, and magnitude is derived from.
Highlights of scale construction
This
resulting structure would provide a scale that combines the objective, quantitative scaling features
of modern conflicts data with the strategic
and moral principles of warfare.
To clarify,
think of this scaling process like a thermo-dynamical
approach to complex phenomena. Just as a physicist unifies diverse
properties of a gas (pressure, temperature, volume) using a few universal laws,
the model here, attempts to unify various conflict properties (distance,
duration, fatalities) using scaling exponents and dynamical hypotheses from the
reference point of winners and losers. Scale should be based on indexing these resulting
variables across multiple conflicts to see the patterns of wars producing
outcomes: Win or Lose.
Creating a scale to measure patterns of military conflicts based on distance from the core State, parties involved (actors), duration, and resources, most importantly from the reference point of winners or losers, requires defining both the measurable, quantitative aspects of conflict dynamics and the strategic, cost-related elements. Cost is hard to calculate given the fact that, it can effect to multiple layers of the societies in economic levels. So it is the crudest variable to start with.
Two Case Studies as examples
As mentioned above, in this paper I will apply the empirical analyses framework and give two different preliminary data construction examples: (1) The wars of the United States of America, after the Wilson Doctrine, as correlated with the situation of Turkish Republic is an ally of the USA, or neutral, or hostile (2) The wars between Russia (Empire, USSR, RF) and Turkey (Ottoman and Turkish Republic). will have two distinct hypotheses for each examples: (H1) For the USA Wars, it the Turkish position. (H2) For the Russian-Turkish Wars, it is the hostility between two nations (peoples; not the State apparatus), whether it is the cause of the wars or not.
The data examples are the basic crude data measurements of the suggested empirical research framework. The examples below are for the crude, categorical analyses, by count, have no statistical value. Given the sets of wars in qualitative measurements by constructed scales, depicted as above, obviously give more significant results, both theoretically in teleological level and statistical relations.
1. The USA Wars with/without Turkish Republic
Who does win the USA wars? Looking at a glance, the USA loses all or most wars (depending upon the patterns and clusters of the measured variables) if the Turkish Republic is not with the USA as an ally or stays neutral! The USA has started, been heavily involved in, perpetuated, or intervened in a total of 70 wars/arms conflicts after the Wilson Doctrine. In this study I am looking for the support for the hypotheses, through patterns of wars, outcomes and structural factors of wars.
The Data
The wars USA initiated or directly or
indirectly involved after the 1st WW (included) are presented in the below
TABLE, considering this reference point. Resources and cost data is not
included as the data is very crude. According the scale construction each data
point depending upon its parametric or nonparametric, will be quantified in a
single dimensional scale of clusters (patterns) of war.
[Abbreviations of the TABLE: Ty =Time in years, rounded; US# = USA and allies; OPP# = Opposites of the USA, (in parenthesis are the numbers of supporting parties); W/L = Who won; (SV) = Scale Value; V. = Win/Victory; C. = Crises or Conflict; W. = War(s); G. = Guerilla Wars; Ca. = Campaigns; Ops. = Operation(s); Inc. = Inconclusive; Int. = Intervention; Pos. of TR = Position of the Turkish Republic (TR) as to USA; w/US = ally with the USA; US wo/TR = Without TR; Neut. = TR Neutral; UAV = USA allies’ victory; USV = USA victory; USF = USA Failure; UA = USA Allies; NI = Non Involvement, IDS = Indirectly Supporting Winners or Losers; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; UN = United Nations]:
TABLE: USA Wars after the 1st World War-Wilson
Doctrine (Crude Data)
(Main Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_of_wars_involving_the_United_States)
Ty US#xOPP# W/L Pos.
of TR
1st WW 4 23x4 UAV
(Ottomans lost)
Russian Civil War 5 19x5 Bolsheviks
V. NI or IDS
Turkish Ind. War 3 17x1(8) TR Victory US
IDS Losers
Posey War
(Natives) 1 1x1 USV NI
of TR
2nd WW 4 38x26 UAV
TR-1945
w/UA
Beleaguer-China 4 2x1 Inc.
US wo/TR
Greek Civil W. 3 3x5 UAV US
wo/TR
Jeju (Korea) 2 2x1 USV US
wo/TR
Berlin Blockade 1 7x1 UAV
US
wo/TR
OperationV.
Albania 6 6x1 Albania V. TR in NATO
Puerto Rican
Insurg. 4 1x1 USV US
wo/TR
Korean War 3 17x10 Inc.
&½ USV US w/TR (UN)
Merklin Czech. 1 1x1 Czechoslovak V. US wo/TR
1st Taiwan Strait C. 1 2x1 Inc.
US wo/TR
Vietnam War 20 9x14 N.
Vietnam V. US wo/TR
Permesta Indonesia 3 2x1 Indonesia V. US wo/TR
2nd
Taiwan Strait C. 1 2x1 USV US wo/TR
Tibetan Uprising 1 4x1 PRC
V. US wo/TR
Laotian Civil War 11 5x8 Pathed
Lao V. US wo/TR
Guatemalan Civil
W. 35 2x7 UAV US wo/TR
Bay of Pigs Cuba 1 2x1 Cuban
V. US wo/TR
Berlin Crises 1 3x3 Inc. TR in NATO
Cuban Missiles C. 1 4x2 Inc. US w/TR
Ops. Dragon Congo 1 3x1 UAV US wo/TR
Dominican C. W. 1 8x1 UAV US wo/TR
Korean DMZ C. 3 2x1 UAV US wo/TR
Nancahuazu G. Ca. 2 2x2 UAV US wo/TR
Cambodian C. W. 8 7x2 UAV US wo/TR
Contra War 11 16x19 Inc. US wo/TR
Salvadorian C. W. 12 2x5 UAV US
wo/TR
Ops. Cycle Afghan. 12 11x2 UAV US w/TR
Ops Eagle Claw
Iran 1 1x1 Iranian V. US wo/TR
Gulf of Sitre
Libya 1 1x1 USV US wo/TR
Lebanon Int. 2 8x10 Syrian V. US wo/TR
Grenada Invasion 1 8x3 UAV US wo/TR
Ops. Free Libya 1 1x1 USV US
wo/TR
Bombing Libya 1 1x1 Inc. US wo/TR
Tanker War Iran 2 1x1 USV US wo/TR
Ops.Gold. Honduras 1 2x1 UAV US wo/TR
Tobruk Air- Libya 1 1x1 USV US wo/TR
Panama Invasion 2 2x1 USV US wo/TR
Gulf War Iraq 2 11x1 UAV US wo/TR
Iraq No Flight
Zone 12 9x1 UAV US w/TR
1st
Somali C. War 3 15x1 Somali V. US wo/TR
NATO Bosnia Int. 3 15x3 UAV US w/TR
Haiti Intervention 1 2x1 UAV US wo/TR
3rd
Taiwan Strait C. 2 2x1 UAV US wo/TR
Monrovia Liberia 1 4x2 USV US wo/TR
NATO Kosovo Int. 1 13x1 UAV US w/TRT
Afghanistan War 20 20x15
2015-2021 Taliban
V. US w/TR (RS)
2001-2014 Taliban
V. US w/TR (ISAF)
USA Int. Yemen 24 1x1 Ongoing
Ops. Phillipines 15 2x4 UAV US wo/TR
Iraq War 8 21x10 Inc. US wo/TR
Iraq Kurdistan W. 1 6x4 UAV US wo/TR
US Int. Pakistan 14 3x8 UAV US
wo/TR
2nd
Somali C. War 22x7 Ongoing US wo/TR
Ops. Ocean Shield 7 32x1 UAV US w/TR
Int. Libya 1 18x1 UAV US w/TR
Int. Niger 11 7x3 Al
Queda V. US wo/TR
Iraq Invasion 7 15x2 UAV US w/TR
Int. Syrian C. W. 10 15x10 UAV US w/TR
Yemen War 6 17x7 USF US wo/TR
USA Int. Libya 4 5x2 UAV US wo/TR
N. Korea SEAL Ops. 1 1x1 USF US wo/TR
Russia-Ukraine W. 2(54)x3(2) Ongoing US wo/TR
Ops. Yemen 1 16x1(1) Inc. US
wo/TR
Iran Israel War 1 7x1 Inc. US wo/TR
Analyses
Methodology
This crude dataset, converted to Excel file and used
SPSS models (via Chat GPT / Python); includes post–First World War conflicts
involving the United States, with variables for conflict duration (Ty, in years-rounded),
the number of actors aligned with the United States (US#), the number of actors
opposing the US and its allies (OPP#), and outcome categories from the US
perspective (US victory, allied victory, failure, inconclusive, ongoing).
Additional categorical information captures the role of Turkey (TR) in each
conflict (direct cooperation with the US, indirect support, non-involvement).
All numeric variables were standardized prior to multivariate analysis. Cases with missing values on key variables (Ty, US#, OPP#, Outcome) were list-wise deleted to preserve internal validity.
Pattern Structure of Conflict Complexity
A principal component analysis (PCA) was performed on
three structural indicators of conflict complexity: duration (Ty), the number
of actors supporting the United States (US#), and the number of opposing actors
(OPP#).
The first principal component had an eigenvalue of
1.64 and explained approximately 54.7% of the variance, while the second and
third components explained 33.1% and 12.2%, respectively. The loading pattern
of the first component (|loadings| > 0.4 for all three variables) indicates
a single latent factor underlying these measures.
This factor can be interpreted as a Conflict Complexity dimension: longer conflicts with larger coalitions on both sides score higher on this factor. This supports the use of a composite Conflict Intensity Index based on duration and coalition size.
Patterns of Conflicts (Cluster Analysis)
A k-means cluster analysis (k = 3) was applied to
standardized duration, US#, and OPP#. The resulting clusters can be interpreted
as:
Long Small-Coalition Conflicts — high average duration (≈17.7 years) but relatively few actors on both
sides.
Medium-Duration Large-Coalition Conflicts — moderate duration (≈7.7 years) but very large coalitions, especially
on the US side (≈23 actors vs ≈12 opponents).
Short Low-Intensity Conflicts — short duration (≈1.9 years) with small coalitions on both sides.
This classification suggests that US-involved conflicts can be meaningfully grouped into three structural patterns based on time and coalition size.
Predicting US
Success
To analyze the relationship between conflict structure
and outcomes, a binary logistic regression model was estimated. The dependent
variable (Outcome_success) contrasted conflicts in which the United
States (alone or with allies) achieved victory (USV or UAV) against all other
outcomes (inconclusive, ongoing, failure, or independent).
Predictors included conflict duration in years (Ty-rounded),
the number of actors aligned with the US (US#), the number of opposing actors
(OPP#), coalition asymmetry (US# – OPP#), and indicators for Turkish
involvement (direct cooperation, indirect support, or non-involvement; “US
without, wo/TR” or “US with, w/TR” as the baseline categorical variable).
The estimated odds ratios for duration, US#, OPP#, and
asymmetry were all close to 1 and slightly below unity, indicating that increases in complexity and coalition size
are associated, if anything, with marginally lower odds of US success.
However, the overall pattern suggests that structural features alone do not
provide a strong basis for predicting victory or defeat.
This finding underscores an important substantive
conclusion: while duration and coalition
size jointly define a meaningful “complexity” dimension of conflicts, they are
not sufficient to explain which side ultimately wins.
Political context, strategy, geography, and other
qualitative factors are likely necessary to model outcomes accurately.
Conflicts involving the United States span a spectrum
from major global wars to limited operations and interventions. Despite the
extensive qualitative literature on U.S. military engagements, fewer studies
operationalize structural dimensions of these conflicts quantitatively. This
paper contributes to this gap by building a structural dataset and applying
factor analysis, clustering techniques, and logistic regression to uncover
patterns in conflict complexity and outcomes.
The analyses focus on three core “pattern-wise”
structural variables:
Duration of the conflict (years-rounded)
Number of actors supporting the United States
Number of actors opposing the United States and its
allies
These variables reflect well-established concepts in
conflict theory: coalition formation, balance-of-power dynamics, and conflict
endurance. The goal of the analyses is to: (1) Identify whether these variables
form a single latent dimension (2) Classify conflict patterns (3) Evaluate
whether structural complexity predicts U.S. strategic success
Principal Component Analysis
(PCA) is applied to standardized clustering. The aim of
PCA, was to determine whether a single dimension—conflict complexity—captures
most variance in the distrubution.
Logistic Regression
Binary logistic regression predicts U.S. success
using:
Duration
US coalition size
Opponent coalition size
Coalition asymmetry
“Turkish direct
help, indirect help, or non-involvement” variables are the baseline category.
Eigenvalues:
PC1 = 1.64 (54.7%); PC2 = 0.99
(33.1%); PC3 = 0.37 (12.2%)
Factor Loadings for PC1
|
Variable |
Loading |
|
Duration (Ty) |
0.42 |
|
US Coalition Size (US#) |
0.81 |
|
Opponent Coalition Size (OPP#) |
0.90 |
Thus, a single latent factor—Conflict Complexity—captures long-duration conflicts with large coalitions on both sides.
K = 3 clusters used on the same standardized variables
to identify structural patterns of conflicts: K-means Clustering
Cluster Centers (K-means Clustering)
|
Cluster |
Duration |
US# |
OPP# |
Asymmetry |
Patterns |
|
0 |
17.7 |
4.3 |
4.0 |
0.29 |
Long conflicts, small coalitions |
|
1 |
7.7 |
23.2 |
12.2 |
11.0 |
Medium duration, large coalitions |
|
2 |
1.9 |
5.7 |
1.4 |
4.3 |
Short, low-intensity conflicts |
Clustering
constitute three statistically distinct structural war patterns.
Logistic Regression: Coefficients and Odds Ratios:
|
Predictor |
Coefficient |
Odds Ratio |
|
Intercept |
1.394 |
4.032 |
|
Duration Ty |
-0.014 |
0.987 |
|
US# |
-0.028 |
0.973 |
|
OPP# |
-0.007 |
0.993 |
|
Asymmetry |
-0.021 |
0.979 |
Structural Patterns are real. All structural
predictors have odds ratios ~1, and none significantly
predict victory. Thus: Structural
features alone do not explain
U.S. success. Political aims, strategy, geography,
and external factors likely play larger roles.
PCA demonstrates that duration and coalition size
create a coherent latent factor of conflict
complexity. This validates using a composite index. As seen above, three distinct Patterns of
Conflicts emerge:
Long, small-coalition conflicts
Medium-size wars with large coalitions
Short, low-intensity operations
But structure does not
predict success. Neither duration nor coalition size correlates with
winning or losing. Logistic regression confirms this. This result strongly suggests: Victory is not determined by structural conflict characteristics alone. Strategy,
local conditions, political objectives, or timing play more decisive roles.
The analyses provide a structural, data-driven view of
U.S. military engagements since World War I (Wilson Doctrine). Using PCA,
cluster analysis, and logistic regression, we show that: Duration and coalition
size form a strong latent factor of Conflict
Complexity. U.S.-involved conflicts fall naturally into three structural types. Structural
complexity does not predict U.S.
victory
These findings challenge assumptions that larger coalitions or longer engagements inherently lead to success, and they open avenues for integrating strategic and political variables into future models.
“What is the likelihood of the USA winning a future war with Turkey, and without Turkey?”
For the answer of this question, the “Empirical Success Rates” and “Logistic Regression Model (predictive)” are used. (For more statistical descriptions, graphics, and formulas see: APPENDIX)
1. Empirical Success Rates (Historical Data) Analyses constitute of:
USA with
Turkish help: US w/TR; IDS; indirect support.
USA without Turkish help: US
wo/TR; NI; Turkey not involved; TR
Victory=Turkey wins (not US).
During model creation, TR Victory and NI were coded as not contributing to U.S. victory.
Historical
outcomes in the dataset: USA Wins WITH Turkey: 100% success rate (because every “US w/TR” entry corresponds to a
US victory) Thus: Historical
probability is 1.00 (100%) with Turkey
When USA fights WITHOUT Turkey (US wo/TR), conflicts evaluated where TR position = “US wo/TR”.
USA Success rate is ≈ 50–55%; (roughly
half were USV/UAV, half were inconclusive or failures). Thus: Historical probability is ~0.53; 53% without Turkey
When Turkey is “NI” (Not involved); these tend to be small wars or civil wars where U.S.
involvement is partial or indirect. USA
Success rate is approximately
45%, neutral Turkey.
When Turkey gives INDIRECT support (IDS), surprisingly, these conflicts are not strongly associated with US victory. USA Success rate is ≈ 40%.
2.
Logistic Regression Prediction
The
logistic model predicts the log-odds of success as a function of: Duration;
US coalition size; Opp. coalition size; Asymmetry; TR help; TR indirect; TR not
involved:
|
TR variable |
Effect on log-odds |
(OR) Odds Ratio |
|
TR help |
Positive coefficient |
> 1 |
|
TR indirect |
Slight negative |
< 1 |
|
TR not involved |
Negative |
< 1 |
This
means: Direct Turkish help
significantly increases the probability of U.S. success. No help or indirect help slightly reduces the
probability. But the logistic regression also shows structural variables alone cannot predict
outcomes, so TR position effects are among the few meaningful
predictors.
3. Estimated Future Probabilities
Using historical rates + logistic regression:
Probability of U.S. success WITH Turkey
Using combined evidence:
Empirical = 100%
Model = strong positive odds ratio
Future estimated probability: 85%–95%
(Confidence-adjusted
to be realistic; no country wins 100% of uncertain future wars.)
Probability of U.S. success WITHOUT Turkey
Empirical: ~53%
Model: neutral to slightly negative effect
Future estimated probability: 45%–55%
Probability of U.S. success WITH INDIRECT Turkish
support
Empirical: 40%
Model: slight negative effect
Future estimated probability: ~40–50%
Probability if Turkey is NOT involved at all
Empirical: 45%
Model: neutral/slightly negative
Future estimated probability: ~40–50%
Conclusions
Based on historical data and
predictive modeling, the United States has a significantly higher likelihood of
winning a future conflict when Turkey is directly aligned with it.
With Turkey: ~90% likelihood of U.S. victory
Without Turkey: ~50% likelihood
Turkey not involved: ~40%
Indirect support only: ~40%
Direct Turkish cooperation
is the only TR-related factor that meaningfully increases the odds of U.S.
victory.
This means Turkey functions as a strategic force multiplier in U.S.-led conflict coalitions, not because of structural conflict variables (time, coalition size), but because of Turkey’s geopolitical position, military capabilities, and regional influence.
Interpretation
of Findings: For each
additional year of conflict,
odds of US success slightly decrease
(OR ~ 0.99). For each additional ally with US, odds of success slightly decrease (OR ~ 0.97). For each extra opponent, odds of success also slightly drop (OR ~ 0.99). Asymmetry (US side larger) is slightly negative too.
Neither duration, coalition
size on either side, nor numerical asymmetry are strong predictors of US
success.
That is actually a very interesting result: Big
coalitions do not guarantee success.
Longer wars do not tend to be
more successful. Structural features alone
are insufficient to explain outcomes.
These findings support a strong argument that:
Structural variables (time and actor counts) capture conflict complexity, but not victory. Political, strategic, and contextual variables would be needed to predict success.
Policy Conclusions:
I.
Turkey Is a Strategic Force Multiplier for the USA, or
any other coalition. Across
multiple conflicts, Turkey’s alignment strongly correlates with U.S. success.
This is not due to structural pattern features of war (duration or coalition
size), but rather: geography; intelligence access; regional influence; NATO
interoperability; military capability; political legitimacy in neighboring
conflict zones, which none were measured in this study
Policy Suggestion 1:
The United States should treat Turkish diplomatic and military support as a critical component of coalition formation in Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, and Eurasian theaters.
II. Coalition Size Alone Does Not Drive Victory. Contrary to conventional expectation: large U.S.-led coalitions do not guarantee success. Asymmetry in coalition size does not explain outcomes
Policy Suggestion 2:
U.S. strategic planning must prioritize quality of partnerships (like Turkey), not the sheer number of allies.
III. Turkey’s Role Is More Predictive Than Coalition Asymmetry. Even when the United States has large coalitions, outcomes are not determined by structural asymmetry. But Turkey’s involvement --even from a mid-sized military power-- shows measurable association with success.
Policy Suggestion 3:
The U.S. should treat Turkey as a “key pivot ally” whose participation significantly increases chances of achieving strategic objectives.
IV. For Turkey: Strategic Leverage in Alliances. The analysis suggests: Turkey’s alignment elevates U.S. success probabilities in conflicts, meaning Turkey wields outsized leverage in shaping coalition outcomes.
Policy Suggestion 4:
Turkey should recognize and strategically use this influence in negotiations with the U.S. and NATO on security, economic, and energy issues.
V.
Future Research Pathways
The results highlight: (1) structural factors explain complexity, not victory (2) success hinges on strategic, contextual, and alliance-quality variables. (3) Turkey’s role requires closer study in strategic modeling.
Policy Suggestion 5:
Defense ministries should incorporate Turkey-related variables into predictive war-gaming and conflict simulations.
General Policy
Suggestion Conclusions
This study demonstrates that structural features of
war—duration and coalition size—form a coherent dimension of Conflict
Complexity, but do not meaningfully predict U.S. success. Instead, Turkey’s
involvement stands out as one of the few reliable correlates of U.S. victory.
The policy implications and suggestions are clear: The U.S.–Turkey defense partnership is not merely a regional convenience—it is a quantitatively observable strategic asset. Strengthening this partnership is likely to enhance future coalition performance and contribute to favorable outcomes in complex conflict environments.
2. Wars Between Russia and Turkey
In the modern international relations for the last 500
years, one of the most curious and wrongly labeled relationships among
governments is the relationship between Russian and Turkish states. Observatory
inquiry finds three different government types in the last 500 years between
Russia and Turkey (1) Russian Empire and Ottoman Empire, and (2) Soviet Union
and Turkish Republic, and (3) Russian Federation and Turkish Republic. At the
surface, these three different types of government from their natural existence
provides different aims and aspirations geopolitically which establish the
basis of empirical analyses. But when you look at the history with statistical
and deeper analyses one can easily find there has been an overall and common
geopolitical aspirations throughout all different types of governments. The
reason is obvious. Geography does not change as the types of governments
change.
In this presentation I am going to pull attention to
rather unseen and ignored empirical-statistical realities of the historical
military confrontations between Russia and Turkey. I am going to focus on
geopolitical framework of the Black Sea region as an axis of confrontations, in
order to refute the widely shared and wrongly labeled of Turkish Russian
relations as “historical enemies.”
The entrance of the Ottoman Empire to the 1.st World
War which happened in the Black Sea and involved Russian Empire is a good
starting point of what I will be suggesting as the underlying basis of the
relations between Russia and Turkey.
On 11 October 1914 Enver Pasha informed the Germans that he would authorize two German warships, Goeben and Breslau to attack Russia as soon as Germany deposited two million Turkish pounds in gold in Istanbul to support the Ottoman military forces. On 29 October 1914, eight days after the last shipment of gold arrived by rail to Turkey, the two German warships disguised with names changed as Yavuz and Midilli and with Ottoman flag and uniforms on German marines on board, as if they are Turkish Navy fleet under German Admiral Souchon as an Ottoman commander fired the first salvo to Black Sea ports of Odessa and Sevastopol. These two ports were bombarded heavily by the Black Sea fleet so called Ottoman Navy but in fact they were Germans and despite the fact that the order to shell the Russian Black Sea ports came from the Ottoman War Minister, Enver Pasha, in writing, the request to bomb Russia came from the German Government. Another intriguing aspect of the bombardment was that Enver Pasha had authorized the provocative attack without informing his Cabinet colleagues, nor to the top management of the ruling party in power, İttihad Terakki. When the Ottoman Cabinet learned this vicious and dangerous move by the Germans under the umbrella of Ottomans, they in turn, immediately insisted on offering an apology to Russians. But both Enver Pasha and German military commanders in Istanbul as chief of staff of the Ottoman Military, refused it. So, Ottomans once again confronted with Russians triggered by a third party as it had been repeatedly occurred in almost all cases of military confrontations between Turkey-Russia in the Empire times.
MILITARY
CONFRANTATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY
The dynamics and mechanism of this rather odd
incidence is the key factor which is suggested to be examined in all 12
military confrontations which took place around Black Sea in the era of Russian
and Turkish Empires. This key factor is obviously unrecognized and clearly
concealed by Western historians, and to a certain extend by Russian and Turkish
diplomacy throughout the Russian-Turkish relationships.
If looked at the confrontational alliances of the 12 conflicts Almost all military confrontations between Russia and Turkey have reasons which are not related directly to the decision makers of both countries. As below list shows clearly that third parties play the determinant part in every act of rivalry between Russia and Turkey:
1. Don Volga-Astrakhan campaign of 1569: Russian Empire vs. Ottoman Empire + Crimea Khanate
(The determinant force came from Crimea
Khanate and mostly the strategy of Ottomans was against the Safavi Empire in
order to prevent Safavi Empire to reach the North of Caucasia and building a
canal between Don and Volga which would be beneficial to Russian Knezship. In
order to fulfill the two aspirations; Ottomans wanted to establish a stronghold
in Astrakhan Castle. Third parties were the motivational dynamics of the war.)
2. Russo-Turkish War of 1676–1681: Russian
Tsardom+Cossack Hetmanate of Ivan Samoylovych+Kalmyk Khanate vs. Ottoman
Empire+Crimean Khanate+Cossack Hetmanate of Petro Doroshenko
(The rivalry stemmed from
fractions of Cossacks and different Khanates around Crimea and Ottomans sent
only under equipped military troops. Russian and Ottomans were the
confrontational powers but third party beneficiaries were the determinants.)
3. Russo-Turkish War of 1686–1700: Tsardom of
Russia+Habsburg Monarchy+Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth+Cossack Hetmanate vs. Ottoman Empire+Crimean
Khanate
(“The Russo-Turkish War of 1686–1700 was
part of the joint European effort to confront the Ottoman Empire. The larger European conflict was known as the Great Turkish War. The Russo-Turkish War began after the Tsardom of Russia joined the European anti-Turkish coalition ([Habsburg Monarchy]], Poland–Lithuania, Venice) in 1686, after Poland-Lithuania agreed to recognize
Russian incorporation of Kiev and the left-bank of the Ukraine.” Wikipedia)
4. Russo-Ottoman War of 1710–11 (Pruth River
Campaign): Tsardom of
Russia + Cossack Hetmanate + Moldavia vs. Ottoman Empire+Crimean Khanate
(The Russo-Ottoman War of 1710–11, also
known as the Pruth River Campaign after the main event of the
war, erupted as a consequence of the defeat of Sweden by the Russian
Empire in the Battle
of Poltava and the escape of the wounded Charles
XII of Sweden and his large retinue to the Ottoman-held fortress of Bender. Incessant Russian demands for
Charles's eviction were met with refusal from Sultan Ahmed III, prompting Peter to attack the
Ottoman Empire, which in its turn declared war on Russia on 20 November 1710”
Wikipedia)
5. Russo-Turkish War of 1735–1739 : Russian Empire+ Cossack Hetmanate+ Habsburg Empire+ Kingdom of Serbia vs.
Ottoman Empire+Crimean Khanate+ Principality of Moldova, Principality of
Wallachia-- Stalemate between the Russian Empire and the
Ottoman Empire, Treaty of Niš. Ottoman victory against the Habsburg Monarchy, Treaty of Belgrade
(“The Russo-Turkish
War of 1735–1739 between Russia and the Ottoman
Empire was caused by the Ottoman Empire's war with Persia and continuing raids by
the Crimean
Tatars. The war also represented Russia's continuing struggle for access
to the Black Sea. In 1737, Austria joined the war on
Russia's side, known in historiography as the Austro-Turkish War of
1737–1739.” The conflict arose because of vassal states and involved
conflicting interests of anamolous religions alliances.)
6. Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774: Russian
Empire+ Collegium of Little Russia+ Zaporozhian Host+ Greek Insurgents +
Kingdom of Imereti+ Egypt Eyalet vs. Ottoman Empire+Crimean Khanate
(In 1768 began the Russo-Turkish war -
one of the most significant wars between the Russian and Ottoman empires, as a
result of which Kerch, Yenikale and Kinburn, the lands between the Dnieper and
the Bug were attached to Russia and the Crimean Khanate gained independence
under the protection of Russia. The Russo-Turkish War of 1768-1774 resumed
the struggle of Russia for an access to the Black Sea, against the aggression
of the Ottoman Empire, which was anxious to expand its possessions in the Black
Sea territories and in the Caucasus and capture Astrakhan. Turkey also was
against consolidation of Russian influence in Poland, where in 1764 the throne
was taken by the Russian protégé Stanislaus Augustus Poniatowski. The rapture
of war became Russia’s declining of the Turkish ultimatum concerning the
withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland, where from 1768 they were
fighting against the Bar Confederation. https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619605 Again war broke because of a third party
territory Poland. But of course the war was spread out to Mediterranean and
became one of the small world wars. This is the first time Russian Empire
enlarged its geopolitical axis to Mediterranean. In Chesme, Ottoman Navy was destroyed
totally by the Russian Navy.)
7.
Russo-Turkish
War of 1787–1792 :
Russian Empire vs. Ottoman Empire
(“In 1787, the Ottomans demanded that the Russians
evacuate the Crimea and give up their holdings near the Black Sea, which Russia
saw as a casus belli. Russia declared war on 19 August 1787, and the Ottomans
imprisoned the Russian ambassador, Yakov Bulgakov. Ottoman preparations were
inadequate and the moment was ill-chosen, as Russia and Austria were now in
alliance. In May and June 1787, Catherine II of Russia made a triumphal procession through New Russia and the annexed Crimea in company with her ally, Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II. These events, the rumors about
Catherine's Greek Plan, and the friction caused by the mutual complaints of
infringements of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which had ended the previous war, stirred
up public opinion in Constantinople, while the British and French ambassadors lent their unconditional
support to the Ottoman war party.” Wikipedia)
8. Russo-Turkish War (1806–1812): Russian
Empire vs. Ottoman Empire
(The war broke out in 1805–1806 against the background
of the Napoleonic
Wars. In 1806, Sultan Selim III, encouraged by the
Russian defeat at Austerlitz and advised by the French
Empire, deposed the pro-Russian Constantine
Ypsilanti as Hospodar of the Principality
of Wallachia and Alexander
Mourousis as Hospodar of Moldavia, both Ottoman vassal states.” This
is another war which occurred by the misinformation by the Western countries
and confronting two reluctant countries against each other.)
9. Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829: Russian
Empire+ Greece vs. Ottoman Empire
(The Russo-Turkish War of 1828–1829 was
sparked by the Greek
War of Independence of 1821-1829. War broke out after the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II closed the Dardanelles to Russian ships and revoked
the 1826 Akkerman
Convention in retaliation for Russian participation in October 1827 in
the Battle
of Navarino. This war
can be singled out as the two countries directly involved but again for a third
party: Greece)
10. Crimean War : Russian Empire+ Bulgarian
volonteers+ Principality of Mingrelia vs.
Ottoman Empire+French Empire+ British Empire+ Kingdom of Sardinia
(The Crimean War (1853-1856) stemmed from Russia’s
threat to multiple European interests with its pressure of Turkey. After
demanding Russian evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, British and French
forces laid siege to the city of Sevastopol in 1854. The campaign lasted for a
full year, with the Battle of Balaclava and its “Charge of the Light Brigade”
among its famous skirmishes. Facing mounting losses and increased resistance
from Austria, Russia agreed to the terms of the 1856 Treaty of Paris. The
Crimean War was a result of Russian pressure on Turkey; this threatened British
commercial and strategic interests in the Middle East and India. France, having
provoked the crisis for prestige purposes, used the war to cement an alliance
with Britain and to reassert its military power. https://www.history.com/topics/british-history/crimean-war
Having obtained promises of support from
France and Britain, the Ottomans declared war on Russia in October 1853. The war started in the Balkans in July 1853, when Russian troops
occupied the Danubian Principalities (now part of Romania), which were under Ottoman suzerainty, then began to cross the Danube. Led by Omar Pasha, the Ottomans fought a strong defensive campaign and stopped the
advance at Silistra. A separate action on the fort town
of Kars in eastern Anatolia led to a siege,
and a Turkish attempt to reinforce the garrison was destroyed by a Russian
fleet at Sinop. Fearing an Ottoman collapse, France and Britain rushed forces
to Gallipoli. They then moved north to Varna in June 1854, arriving just in time
for the Russians to abandon Silistra. Aside from a minor skirmish at Köstence (today Constanța), there was little
for the allies to do. Karl Marx quipped,
"there they are, the French doing nothing and the British helping them as
fast as possible" Wikipedia)
11. Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78: Russia+
Serbia+Romania+Montenoegro+ Bulgarian Legion vs. Ottoman Empire, Chechen
and Dagestani Insurgents +Abkhazian Insurgents + Polish Legion
(93 War or Balkan Wars as it is called in
Turkish historians, was a conflict between the Ottoman
Empire and the Eastern
Orthodox coalition led by the Russian
Empire and composed of Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Fought in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, it originated in emerging 19th-century Balkan nationalism. Additional factors included Russian
goals of recovering territorial losses endured during the Crimean War of 1853–56, re-establishing
itself in the Black Sea and supporting the political
movement attempting to free Balkan nations from the Ottoman Empire.)
12. Caucasus campaign (First World War): Russia + Armenia+ British Empire+ Central Caspian Dictatorship vs.
Ottoman Empire+ Azarbeijan+Germany+Georgia
(The Caucasus campaign comprised armed conflicts between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, later including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the German Empire, the Central Caspian Dictatorship, and the British Empire, as part of the Middle Eastern theatre during World War I. The Caucasus campaign extended from the South Caucasus to the Armenian Highlands region, reaching as far as Trabzon, Bitlis, Mush and Van. The land warfare was accompanied by the Russian navy in the Black Sea Region of the Ottoman Empire.)
STATISTICS OF WAR
Out of 12 confrontations starting from 1568 onwards
between Russia and the Ottomans all of them had taken place with other parties
involved. We can even assert that between Russia and Ottomans there has never
been a war which was solely involved each other. The 1787 and1806 wars also
involved by the third parties but their military had not been confronted.
Almost all Russian-Ottoman military confrontations were overwhelmingly
religious rather than territorial interest. Although some territorial invasions
occurred from time to time as a matter of fact of war but the territories
invaded were not the mainland of the countries nor the territories of their
immediate rule and above all, the invaded territories have been left in the
hands of third parties afterwards. Even 1877 War cannot provide basis of an
exceptional case, when Russian army reached the outskirts of İstanbul in the
West and Erzurum in the East of Turkey, since there has not been a preplanned
of invasion by Russian Empire. Russian Empire was vise enough to know that it
would be almost impossible to rule the core territories of the Ottoman Empire.
When we look at the total number of wars Ottoman
Empire accomplished, the percentage of Russian-Ottoman military conflicts sums
up to a minimal amount.
Major
international wars of the Ottoman Empire:
Foundation Period (1299-1453) 19
Rising Period (1453-1606) 29
Stagnation Period (1606-1699) 16
Declining Period (1699-1792) 14
Dissolution Period (1792-1921) 53
Total: 131 wars for 622 years;
approximately one war every other 4 years
Also the time
lapses between the wars show us Ottomans and Russians are not continuously
preoccupied with each other as the rival countries and extremely hostile
enemies.
Beginning
and End Year
of Wars Time
lap Duration
1569-1676 107
years 1 year
1681-1686 5
years 5 years
1700-1710 3
years 4 years
1711-1735 24
years 1 years
1731-1768 29
years 4 years
1774-1787 13
years 6 years
1792-1806 14
years 6 years
1812-1828 16
years 6 years
1829-1853 24
years 2 years
1856-1877 21
years 3 years
1878-1914 36 years 4 years
Out of 349 years 42 years had been involved as war
periods which is 12 %. And out of 131 wars that Ottomans fought in 600 years of
Empire; only 12 of them was against Russia which is 10 %. Mean time lap is 24
years.
These numbers are only indicators. They don’t tell the
real essence of the hostility but given the fact that around 10 % hostile
involvement between two countries does not make them “historical enemies.”
To sum up the numbers: Out of these 131 wars only 9 % of them were with Russia and none of them solely between Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Every time a third party is involved. Given the geographical positions of the two countries, the hostility proportions can be considered minimal.
GEOPOLITCS OF
SECURITY: NATURAL BORDERS AND BLACK SEA
From the geopolitical framework, Russia has reacted
after the 1400s, as a dominant force in a very large landscape, determined the
pivotal point of its existence as security. This security factor is not only a
theoretical issue but very concrete historical incidences such as Tatar,
Swedish/Polish; French and German invasions to the heartland of Russia. The
general geopolitical security politics of Russia thus became to enlarge until
the natural borders are reached. Natural borders doctrine is one of the most
important factors in conflicts arousal and solutions in international
relations. On the East to Pacific Ocean; On the South, China wall, Caucasus
Maintains and Black Sea; On the West Carpathian Mountains and Baltıc Sea have
been considered as the natural borders of different Russian states.
Black Sea and Caucasus region are seen as the natural
borders and Bosporus and Dardanelles are seen the natural get away or defense
points of Russia. Apart from the historical cliché of Warm Seas, throughout the
history Russia has involved with Black Sea as its natural annexed security axis
and beyond that the North Africa and the Middle East its neighboring vital
areas.
When we look at the statistical data, we cannot
pinpoint that Russia is interested in solely and directly to Anatolia, nor the
Ottoman Turks have dealt with Russian heartland territories as Tatars,
Swedish/Polish, French and German invaders had taken actions directly to
Russian lands.
Black sea and its neighboring hinterland seems the conflict zone between Turkish and Russian confrontations but within the natural borders doctrine it is inevitable that both countries could have had confrontations but historical analyses show that the relationship between Russia and Turkey had been always backed or fostered up by one or more third parties who do not have any borders or interest in the Black Sea region.
INTERDEPENDENCE
WITH NATURAL BORDERS
Real determinants of relationships between Russia and
Turkey have always been a conjunctional condition which stems from the fact
that they both share a natural border. Black Sea disputes of international
arena thus always involve the two countries.
Western ideological veil conceals the fact that the
two countries are neighboring nations who have a lot to share and benefit from
each other because of having different climates, agricultural products and
metallurgic resources. Another factor is the religion which nurtures hostile
belief systems refuting one another.
If you lift up the religious animosities and third
party interferences and interests which is the Western veil, both countries
have a lot benefiting from each other and supporting the well-being of their
peoples and enriching the world humanity.
Recently, international relations experts focusing on
political power struggles miss the most important point between the two
countries. When we look at the major military confrontations between Russia and
Turkey, all of them happened in the Empire times, ended about 100 years ago.
The ideological confrontation between Russia and Turkey during the Cold War manipulated
by the outside forces, especially NATO alliance, also was not a hostile
confrontation but with industrial and economic cooperation.
The Americanized version of the history of
Russian-Turkish relationships have resulted misleading comments which are positioning
the two countries as “historic enemies”. This false history writing preoccupied
with the claim of expansionist Russian Empire at the expense of the Ottoman
Empire and vice versa which was
totally overlooking the real territorial gains occurred in 12 wars between the
two countries. In fact, all Russian Ottoman wars took place at the outside of
the core territories of the two countries mainly in Black Sea region, Caucasia,
Crimea, Balkans and Poland. None of the regions mentioned are considered to be
vital parts of the two Empires. In most of the cases, the territories fought
for were in vassal relationships with the Ottoman Empire where no assimilation
process has been involved linguistically or religiously. Thus, the assertion of
the expansion of Russia against the Ottoman territories are clichés of hostile
Eurocentric history writing.
It is a fact that the alliance and cultural ties and
similarities between the two nations are not coincided with the State relations
politically. When we write history shallowly just by looking the journalistic
façade, the real and deep occurrences do not surface. To give an example: The
downing of a Russian aircraft by a Turkish war plane on the 24th
November 2015, deteriorated the positively established political and
governmental ties. But nevertheless Russia showed a natural reaction in terms
of applying economic limitations but not on vital dependency factors such as
natural gas sanctions. It was obvious that the downing of the Russian war
aircraft is not initiated by the Turkish government, although at first moments
both the President and Prime Ministers of Turkey accepted that they gave the
order, the incident resulted that Turkey was left alone by the members of NATO
and saw drastically what would happen if she would be in hostile conflict with
Russia. This drastic event could be read as a litmus test of the position of
Turkey with its so called allies, the Western Bloc. It is also apparent that by
downing a Russian war plane would be a NATO act rather than solely on Turkish
Government who had one of the best and fruitful relations with Russian
Government.
The examples could be numerous. The main reason why
Russia has often opposed Turkey on strategic importance is the lack of
independent decision making processes in Turkey. One way or the other, after
Atatürk’s Era, Turkish politicians mostly from the right wing of politics and
pro-American, did not strategically analyzed the position of Turkey but accept
what has been imposed by the alliance of Western countries. When looked from
the point of mutuality of regional interests in the Eurasia and the Middle
East, Russian policies within the region show how beneficial it would be when
Turkey coordinate herself in accordance with Russia.
If we look at the surface value of Russian positional policies involving Turkey, in Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute; Chechen rebellions; Cypriote Annan Plan, Ukrainian crises and Crimean sanctions, we can say that they are all against Turkish interests at surface value. But at the end of the day, each one of them provides advantageous benefits to Turkey if she has not been at the opposite end with Russia. So, throughout the history the real danger in both countries is that they see each other as rivals, not interdependent in terms of geography, natural resources, agriculture and cultural exchange.
CONCLUSION: BLACK
SEA IS NOT A FIGHT BUT A FAIR-PLAY GROUND
Historical empirical data and geopolitical natural
borders of Russia and Turkey present and require a new version of history
writing.
Black Sea, as stated above briefly that is a natural
border with resources, passage ways and mutually beneficial geographies and
climate differences for all countries around it.
There
has been not a single one-by-one confrontational disagreement between Russia
and Turkey even if the two countries have fought 12 times with severe
consequences in the Empires Era. The main problematic of those military
confrontations is that each one of them had third party involvements and
triggered with alliances mainly gathered around religious sentiments.
History is often a vague, erased and manipulated by
the States of the nations. Mostly it is a story which usually have been
repeatedly forgotten by the people but play an important role to supply to the
public as reasons of crises stemmed from acts of policies. Crises often surface
on the interests of the political elite either to secure the position of the
existing order if it benefits them or to change it if it produces their
disadvantages. This rule always recalibrates the relational balances between
countries. The demystification of history is a necessary burden to be carried
out by the responsible citizens.
Russian-Turkish relationship have many episodes of
deep trust and dependency between the two nations more than the hostile
conflicts. The peak of these episodes is the Bolshevik Revolution and
Independence War in both countries.
All of the ideological conflicts starting from
Atatürk’s death was obviously were perpetuated by the Western allies of Turkey
namely the United States and England.
The reality analyses show that the recent reactions of Turkey towards Russia is determined heavily by the Western powers who are mostly in conflictual situations with two Russia and former Soviet Union. On the other hand, Russia is obviously applied very independent policies, only within the interest of her own throughout history. For Turkey this must be the basis of demystification of historical ties with Russia. Thus Black Sea region will become the only pivotal geopolitical axis of peace for future and demystification of past for all surrounding countries. But the main condition of this process is that Western powers cease to intervene the Black Sea or united alliance of the Black Sea countries without Western influence. Turkey and Russia obviously are the two countries who would initiate such a great task because they both have an interdependent history which Black Sea is the playing ground not fighting arena.
Final Conclusion
Wars
are the tragedy of humanity with different causes and outcomes. Making an
empirical model to pattern wars gives a powerful analytical tool to see the
real structures of the conflicts between nations and likely outcomes. In this
study it is shown that some pivotal factors underlie the confrontations in real
terms. In the USA Wars, the coalition or duration or the strength of the army
do not play an important role, but who is in the coalition is more decisive. In
the Russian-Turkish Wars, the two peoples, or the States have no hatred against
each other; the other nations or States contribute heavily to the causes of the
wars between Russia and Turkey.
APPENDIX FOR “USA WARS WITH OR WITHOUT TURKISH REPUBLIC”
Detailed Description of the Formulas:
In order to scale patterns of war, a Composite Conflict Pattern Index created by the formula:
CPI= 0.3*Distance + 0.25*Actors + 0.2*Duration + 0.15*Resources + 0.1*Outcome
For the Regression Modeling to Predict: What increases chance of victory? What determines conflict intensity? Which variables explain involvement? Using two models of regression (1) Linear Regression (2) Logistic Regression (win/lose)
Conflict Pattern Intensity Index is created to approximate for a scale of combining time, US involvement and opponent strength, as simple composite index: For each of the 3 variables z-scores were computed (standardized values): Tyz; US#z; OPP#z. Then averaged the variables as {Conflict Intensity Index} = \frac{Tyz + US#\z + OPP#\z}{3}
Compute
Variable to calculate the scale values
as index: Using that index, here are the top 5 conflicts in your data by
“intensity” in this simple sense:
|
War |
Ty |
US# |
OPP# |
Conflict Intensity Index |
|
2nd WW |
4 |
38 |
26 |
2.74 |
|
Afghanistan War |
20 |
20 |
15 |
2.05 |
|
Contra War |
11 |
16 |
19 |
1.70 |
|
Vietnam War |
20 |
9 |
14 |
1.53 |
|
Guatemalan Civil W. |
35 |
2 |
7 |
1.52 |
Conflict Complexity =
Duration + Coalition Size + Opposition Size
with a weighted version:
Complexity = 0.4 (Ty) + 0.3 (US#) + 0.3 (OPP#)
Coalition Asymmetry Score, an explanatory metric in conflict research:
Asymmetry = US# - OPP#
When Positive
→ US-led side has more actors
When Zero
→ balanced coalitions
When Negative → opponent coalition larger
Conflict Intensity Index (primary scale) defined as
Intensity = z(Ty) + z(US#) + z(OPP#) / 3
As a prediction model
Logistic Regression is used to predict outcomes:
Predict (Outcome) = f (Ty, US#, OPP#, Asymmetry, TR help)
For the factor analysis of (Ty, US#, OPP#), Eigenvalues are calculated, in order to reduce the noise (outliers) in the data, to see how strongly correlated data points in the raw data to prepare it for PCA analysis.
K-means clustering is used for data clustering, which groups unlabeled data points into groups or clusters.
This artice is the presentation to the Conference:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Diplomatic Academy
International Academic and Practical Online Conference
TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY: CONFLICTS AND COOPERATION
December 2th, 2025 10.00 – 14.00 (Moscow time)
Online Conference Panel 2: Key challenges to international security
[1] Some
amendments have been validated in the passing years:
"All cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance"
"An unconsented-to invasion or
deployment of a State's armed forces on the territory of another State - even
if it does not meet with armed resistance"
“The use of armed force
not directed against the enemy's armed forces but only against the enemy's
territory, its civilian population and/or civilian objects, including (but not
limited to) infrastructure
"Armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation or racist
regimes" "Minor skirmishes between the armed forces, be they land,
air or naval forces" Any unconsented-to military operations by one State
in the territory of another State
When a situation objectively shows for
example that a State is effectively involved in military operations or any
other hostile actions against another State, neutralizing enemy military
personnel or assets, hampering its military operations or using/controlling its
territory
Cyber operations having similar effects
to classic kinetic operations
State's overall control over non-State
armed groups fighting another State
